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Abstract
Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) was first diagnosed in the United States on
January 15, 2020, in the state of Washington. Shortly after that, on February 29, 2020, the first
case of COVID-19 was reported in New York City. From January 2020 through July 2020, there
were 223,107 cases of COVID-19 that led to 18,787 COVID-19 related deaths in New York City
alone. During this time, many left New York City to avoid contracting the virus or to return
home. This travel seeded much of the transmission within the United States. We aimed to
identify any international transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2
(SARS-CoV-2) as well from New York City and quantify the number of lasting transmission
events by combining traditional epidemiological methods with phylogenetic and genomic
methods.
By subsampling more than 450,000 SARS-CoV-2 genomes publicly available up to
2020-11-02, we estimated the number of times SARS-CoV-2 was introduced from New York
City to various geographic regions, not including the United States. On average, there were 6.7
different transmission events from New York City to other regions of the world between January
and July of 2020. On average, Western Europe had the most introductions from New York City,
followed by Northern Europe. These results were somewhat expected based on air-travel data
where we saw that most travelers from New York City flew to the Caribbean, Northern Europe,
and Western Europe. Overall, this study helps show that outbreaks within the United States, such
as the New York City outbreak, helped fuel the international transmission events.
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Introduction
In December 2019, it was determined that SARS-CoV-2 was the cause of a pneumonia
outbreak in Wuhan, China (Coronaviridae Study Group of the International Committee on
Taxonomy of Viruses et al., 2020; Wu et al., 2020; Zhou et al., 2020; Fauver et al., 2020). As
soon as January 13, 2020, travel-associated cases of COVID-19 were seen outside China (Fauver
et al., 2020; WHO Situation Report-1, 2020; WHO Situation Report-63, 2020). Less than a week
later, the first case of COVID-19 was diagnosed in the United States (CDC Travel Case, 2020).
The virus has since spread across the globe to nearly every country (WHO Situation Report-63,
2020). As a result, the United States started to ban travel from various countries and regions
starting on January 31, 2020(Taylor, 2020). Roughly a month later, the first communitytransmitted case of COVID-19 was diagnosed in the United States despite these bans (Moon et
al., 2020).
Between January 21, 2020, and July 31, 2020, there have been 410,365 confirmed cases
of COVID-19 and 27,600 COVID-19 related deaths in New York state. Of those confirmed cases
and COVID-19 related deaths, 223,107 cases and 18,787 COVID-19 related deaths were
reported from New York City alone (COVID Data Tracker, 2020). Many New Yorkers decided
to leave the city as cases increased in the early wave of the pandemic. In early April, the daily
incidence peaked in New York City at nearly 11,000 new cases a day (New York COVID Map,
2020). The post office received over 81,000 mail forwarding requests from New York City
residents in that same month. The majority of those requests were for outside the city (Paybarah,
Bloch, & Reinhard, 2020). Later in the year, it became apparent that infected travelers from New
York City travel helped seed outbreaks across the United States (Carey & Glanz, 2020).
Despite this, local officials often don’t know where or how outbreaks start until they can
retroactively analyze the outbreak. However, people often need a source of blame for the
outbreak (Jaworsky & Oiaoan, 2020). Frequently, due to various reasons such as health policy
and politics, local outbreaks are blamed on international travelers (Chinazzi et. al, 2020; Dickens
et. al, 2020; DPH, 2020; Travelers, 2020; Jaworsky & Oiaoan, 2020). International travel is often
listed as a potential source for a local outbreak or included in policies enacted to help slow the
rate of new infections in hopes to protect “the well-being of America” (Liptak and Vazques,
2020; DPH, 2020; Governor Cumo, 2020; Governor Lamont, 2020). With this analysis, we hope
to shift the focus from solely what international travelers might bring to the US to what travelers
from the US might bring with them. By using phylogenetic methods to gain insight into one of
the more significant outbreaks within the US, which helped seed numerous local outbreaks, we
show that the New York City outbreak was also the origin of international spread of SARS-CoV2. Therefore, showing that actions within the United States can lead to consequences elsewhere
and that the US is just as involved in the further spread of the virus as other countries.
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Methods

To investigate the transmission patterns of SARS-CoV-2 and possible transmission
events from New York City internationally, we used phylogenetic analysis to model global
spread. Due to the abundance of available SARS-CoV-2 genomes we decided that we needed
subsampled genomes to ensure that only quality samples were included. Additionally, we
subsampled to better infer reliable phylogenies on this data due to the large number of similar
sequences and low number of mutations (Morel et al., 2020). To add further information to the
claims that the phylogenetic analysis produced, we collected flight data from New York City that
shows the number of passengers that flew from any of the airports in New York City (John F.
Kennedy International Airport, LaGuardia Airport, and Newark International Airport). We then
used the number of passengers who flew from New York City to their destination region to
indicate where probable transmission events occurred.
Mortality Rates, Incidence, and Flight Data
Mortality rates were collected using the data publicly available on the Johns Hopkins
Coronavirus Resource Center website (Mortality, 2020). We collected New York City and
United States mortality rates from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), where
they have separated total United States mortality and New York City's mortality rate to find
individual mortality rates (United States, 2021). These rates were used to create a proportion of
global mortality by country and multiplied by 1,350 to achieve the desired total genome amount
from each country. The resulting number of genomes from each country were used in the
phylogenetic analyses (all numbers rounding up to the nearest whole number).
To understand the spread of COVID-19 within New York City between December 2019
and July 2020, we collected daily COVID-19 incidence data from the CDC reflecting cases in
New York City (United States, 2021). We also collected flight data from OAG Aviation
Worldwide Limited and CDC to get an insight into where probably SARS-CoV-2 transmission
events occurred. This data was aggregated and filtered to only include flights leaving New York
City-based flights. It was then grouped by destination region. The region assignment was
assigned using the region assignments described by the United Nations with the addition of the
‘New York City’ and ‘USA’ regions (Standard, 2021). The addition of these two regions allowed
us to find introductions on a region level, while still allowing for the source to solely be New
York City. In addition, it also allowed us to ignore introductions from New York City to other
areas within the United States and separate those introduction events from the North America
region. This region grouped method was used for the flight data as well as both the Bayesian and
maximum-likelihood phylogenies. For a complete list of the number of flight passengers from
New York City during the study period, see Supplementary Table 2.
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Phylogenetic analyses
All publicly available complete SARS-CoV-2 genomes worldwide were based on data
available from GISAID up to October 26, 2020. Since each country has different genome
sequencing approaches and different infection rates, these genomes were then subsampled. All
genomes used were filtered to be collected between December 1st, 2019, and July 31st, 2020,
from a human host. Additionally, the genomes were then subsampled by country-level mortality
rate, based on the mortality rate per 100,00 population for each country in the world and New
York City. Using a subsampling scheme, we subsampled a proportion of the genomes from a
country based on their mortality rate when compared to the global mortality rate. This process
was repeated three different times, each with different genomes being selected, to solidify the
number of introductions to each region. This allowed us to generate three different subsamples of
about 1,350 genomes.
Using an augur pipeline, we performed multiple sequence alignment using MAFFT
(Hadfield et al., 2018; Katoh & Standley, 2013). Following this, we were able to mask the 5’ and
3’ ends along with any problematic sites (Maio et al., 2013). Then we were able to construct a
maximum likelihood (ML) tree using IQ-Tree (Minh et al., 2020). This used a general time
reversible (GTR) nucleotide substitution model (Guindon & Gascuel, 2003; Yang 1994).
Additionally, IQ-Tree was used to get 1,000 UFBoot replicates during the tree inference (Minh et
al., 2020). TimeTree 0.8.0 was then used to reconstruct ancestral states and infer divergence
times (Sagulenko et al., 2018). The resulting trees (one for each subsample) were rooted on a
SARS-CoV-2 virus sequence hCov-19/Wuhan/WH01/2019 (EPI_ISL_406798). This provided
an insight into what we might expect from a Bayesian phylogenetic state reconstruction. During
the creation of the maximum likelihood trees, region-level metadata was assembled using
country-level metadata. Depending on the country of origin, a region label was assigned to each
genome in the subsample (see Supplementary Table 1).
TempEst was then used to perform quality control measures. Using these trees as inputs
for a root-to-tip analysis (Rambaut et al., 2016). We removed dozens of genomes (n=36,38,26)
from each subsample to remove outliers with residuals above ± 0.00025 subs/site. These smaller
datasets were then rerun through the pipeline.
Finally, we performed Bayesian inference of the ancestral states using BEAST v1.10
(Suchard et al., 2018). We used the time-scaled maximum-likelihood trees as fixed topologies,
sampling every 1,000 generations, through 100,000,000 MCMC iterations, using the BEAGLE
library (v3.1.0) to accelerate the computation (Ayres et al., 2019). We choose this approach to
obtain the Bayesian inferred ancestral states without having to wait for the time needed to
8

compute a full Bayesian solution. This led to convergence and thorough mixing, with all
parameters obtaining an ESS greater than 200 when evaluated with Tracer 1.7 (Rambauet et al.,
2018). After discarding 20% of the sampled tree as burn-in, TreeAnnotator was used to get the
final trees. These trees were identical to the TimeTree output but had BEAST inferred ancestral
states. Then we combined the ML bootstrap support and Bayesian inference of ancestral states
with the time-scaled maximum-likelihood trees. To identify any independent transmission events
of SARS-CoV-2 from New York City, we found clades (UFBoot > 70; MRCA discrete state
probability > 0.7) with at least three taxa (see Figure 1 D). These introductions were deemed
lasting transmission (non-singleton) events, while clades with less than three taxa were
considered to be singleton events (du Plessis et al., 2021). We did this as the assumption of a
singleton as an independent introduction is questionable. This is particularly true when the
sample is sparse or unrepresentative, and the proportion of sequencing is low (0.13% sequenced
samples out of all cases) (du Plessis et al., 2021).

Results
SARS-CoV-2 was first detected in New York City on February 29th, 2020, with case
numbers peaking in April of that year (Gonzalex-Reiche et al., 2020; United States, 2021).
Studies have shown that SARS-CoV-2 was likely to have started circulating before February
29th in New York City, before the many US and non-US issued travel bans took place
(Silverman, 2020; Chubb, 2020; Travelers, 2021). Due to the wide gaps in surveillance,
continued travel, and the outbreak of COVID-19 in New York City, we hypothesized that travel
from New York City would lead to transmission events of SARS-CoV-2 outside the United
States between February 19, 2020, and June 25, 2020 (see Supplementary Figure 1).
To investigate whether SARS-CoV-2 was spread internationally from travel related to
New York City, we used travel surveillance data to reveal where probable transmission events
would have occurred (fig map/table airlines). Our data demonstrate that the majority of
international travel from New York City between January 2020 and July 2020 indicates that the
most probable regions for transmission to occur were the Caribbean, Northern Europe, and
Western Europe (see Figure 3A).
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Figure 1. Phylogenetic analysis results for transmission events from New York City
internationally.
A. A maximum likelihood phylogeny colored by region. B. This is the clade within the above
phylogeny that highlights the transmission events from New York City. C. Time-informed
maximum likelihood phylogeny clades showing where transmission events from New York
City can be found. D. Where the average number of transmission events were introduced.
The size of the region is a proportion of total average introduction events.
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However, based on the phylogenetic analysis, we found different results. Using the cutoff
values of UFBoot > 70 and MRCA discrete state probability > 0.7 which were found to best
emulate Bayesian inference, we estimate that there were only 6.67 transmission events from New
York City, resulting in sustained transmission chains (Alpert et al., 2021). Additionally, there
were two transmission events into Western Europe, one transmission event into Northern
Europe, and no transmission events into the Caribbean, unlike what we expected based on travel
data. Interestingly, based on available genomic data, our analyses have not detected any
transmission events from New York City into Southeastern Asia, Southern Asia, Central Asia,
Eastern Europe, Middle Africa, Eastern Africa, Southern Africa, North America, and the
Caribbean (see Figure 2 A). Each subsample found varying transmission events by region except
for transmission events into Northern Europe (see Figure 2 B-D). The largest range of captured
transmission events between the subsamples was two. In addition to capturing the transmission
events from New York City to various geographic regions, we were able to estimate that these
events happened both before and after travel restrictions were imposed both by the United States
and by other countries. For values captured by each subsample, see supplementary table 3.
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Figure 2. Locations of Transmission Events from New York City.
A. A map and figure legend for where transmission events from New York City were
captured. The arrow width is the number of average transmission events captured to that
region. B-D. The transmission events captured in the various subsamples. E. Box plots
that show the spread of the events captured between subsamples by geographic region.

When we looked into each geographic region, we found that, with the exception of the
Caribbean, there was a slight positive correlation (0.528) between the number of available
sequences and the number of passengers on flights from New York City to that region (see
Figure 3 B). The Caribbean had the most flight passengers from New York City, but it also had
the least amount of publicly available genomes (see Figures 3 A and 3 C). This limited the
chances of detecting sustained transmissions from New York City to that region. When we
looked into the correlation between the average number of transmission events from New York
City and the number of flight passengers, and only accounted for regions with more than one
thousand genomes, we also found a positive correlation of 0.632 (see Figure 3 D). However,
there were still regions that we didn’t capture any transmission events that still met this criterion.
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Figure 3. Flight and sequence availability.
A. The proportion of flight passengers that flew from New York City. Their end destination is
considered the region to which they travelled. B. A scatterplot of the number of publicly available
genomes by geographic region at the time of subsampling by the number of flight passengers. The
total number of genomes here are show on a log scale. C. A bar graph that shows the relationship
between the number of publicly available genomes by geographic location on a log scale. The
numbers above each column represent the total number of available genomes at the time of
subsampling in that region. D. A scatterplot that shows the relationship between the average number
of transmission events captured and the number of flight passengers by region. Only regions with one
thousand or more publicly available genomes are shown.
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Discussion
By shifting the focus from what international travelers might bring to the US and
focusing on what US travelers might bring to other regions, we found evidence that transmission
events of SARS-CoV-2 from New York City to geographic regions outside the United States
occurred. During our study period of December 2019 through July 2020, New York City had
varying amounts of restrictions. During the beginning of the study period, there were little to no
COVID-19 related restrictions in New York City until early March, despite the area becoming a
hot spot of transmission (Governor, 2020; New York State, 2021; NYC, 2020). During this
period, many residents and tourists of the area were unknowingly transmitting the virus. Using
flight passenger data, we estimated that New York City originating transmission events would
most likely occur in the Caribbean, Northern Europe, and Western Europe. Our study provides
that there were independent COVID-19 introductions from New York City to multiple
geographic regions. Moreover, we found that all transmission events captured, regardless of
region, were non-singleton introductions.
By only looking at one US city, we were able to see multiple transmission events,
including numerous lasting transmission events, across the globe. These findings, therefore,
highlight the need to view US travelers as a potential giver of SARS-CoV-2 to other regions. The
US has been the recipient of virus transmission during this pandemic, but through our research
we can see that it has also dealt its fair share of transmission.
To ensure that we were capturing transmission events, despite subsampling the data, we
created three different subsamples of genomic data and created phylogenetic models for each
dataset. It was also compelling to see that each subsample performed very similarly. Each model
began with about 1,350 genomes, and after quality control measures, each ended with roughly
1,320 genomes. After constructing the phylogenetic trees, each subsample also captured lasting
transmission events to the same regions. Additionally, the number of singleton introductions was
roughly the same. Different subsamples help us highlight the variability of phylogenetic models
while also ensuring that true transmission events were captured.
To create our phylogenetic trees, we took a nontraditional approach. Instead of using
purely Bayesian phylogenetic methods, such as a traditional BEAST analysis, we instead used a
combination of methods and meshed them together. This allowed for various things to occur,
such as quick results, the ability to set thresholds, and the potential to compare future traditional
Bayesian results to this analysis to check validity. By using BEAST only to determine ancestral
state reconstruction instead of performing the complete analysis, we were able to produce results
in days rather than weeks or months. In addition, by using a bootstrapped IQ tree with branch
lengths determined by TreeTime, we could set cutoff thresholds. This allowed us to set
thresholds that resemble previous traditional BEAST results without the wait. This meshed
approach could be useful for near real-time genomic epidemiology to produce robust and
meaningful results without the wait time associated with Bayesian phylogenetics.
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Our study does have several limitations. First, the full extent of transmission events, both
lasting and singleton, were likely not captured. It’s important to note that due to the variability
among sequencing capacity, various regions and countries do not have the same ratio of publicly
available genomes as other geographic regions. Therefore, due to dependence on genomes, we
may not have captured all of the transmission events from New York City or all of the lasting
transmission events. For example, most air passengers during the study period flew from New
York City to the Caribbean. However, we didn’t find any transmission events occurring from
New York City to that region. This is largely due to the lack of publicly available genomes from
the Caribbean. While there are hundreds of thousands of publicly available SARS-CoV-2
genomes, not all regions have the same amount of sequences available. This may have
influenced the results of other regions as well. Additionally, our analysis does not account for
behavior beyond air travel. In reality, individual behavior, local health policies, and local
conditions play important roles in transmission patterns and could help explain why New York
City originating transmission events were successful in various regions while others were not.
Finally, by subsampling the genomes and by not being able to observe all infections, we may
have also failed to capture transmission events. But the lack of available genomic data made the
inclusion of more genomes from highly sequenced regions difficult. As more sequencing data
becomes available, efforts to capture transmission events should be revisited.
Notwithstanding these limitations, our analysis provides insights into the introduction,
exportation, and establishment of SARS-CoV-2. This was made possible by linking travel data,
epidemiological data, and genomic data together. Public health authorities should be operating
with the assumption that the United States is playing a role in international transmission and
establishment of SARS-CoV-2. Therefore, the use of genomic epidemiology and traditional
epidemiological methods should be prioritized to help understand and slow the transmission of
SARS-CoV-2.

Conclusions

By combining travel data with genomic epidemiology, we estimated transmission events
from New York City to different world regions. All of these transmission events lead to nonsingleton transmission within the region. This debunks the notion that the United States was only
a recipient of virus introduction and not the giver of virus transmission. By looking at the
outbreak in New York City, we were able to see how the US helped further international
outbreaks. However, it is critical to acknowledge that due to the limited amount of publicly
available genomes from various geographic regions and the sample size of the analysis, the
strength of the conclusion drawn was impacted. It is therefore essential that results from genomic
epidemiology studies are validated with epidemiological data.
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Supplement
To ensure that we were capturing introductions from New York City to different geographic
regions, we needed a way to ensure that each genome that belonged to a specific region was
grouped within that region. As such, we used the standard country methodology given by the
United Nations statistics division with the addition of the ‘USA’ and ‘New York City.’ These two
additional regions were included for our analysis purposes to see where transmission events
from New York City on a region level occurred and to make sure that transmission events
captured from New York City to other locations within the United States were able to be
differentiated from transmission events to other North American countries.

Supplementary Table 1: Region allocations. Below shows each geographic region used in the analysis.
Each row contains the region name and what countries or locations were grouped into that region. For this
analysis, the United States and New York City were listed as individual regions outside North America.
Countries with multiple spellings are denoted as country name (secondary country name).
Region

Countries Within the Region

Oceania

Australia, Christmas Island, Cocos, Heard Island and McDonald Islands, New
Zealand, Norfolk Island, Melanesia, Fiji, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea,
Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Micronesia, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands,
Micronesia, Nauru, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Polynesia, American Samoa,
Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Niue, Pitcairn Islands, Samoa, Tokelau, Tonga,
Tuvalu, Wallis and Futuna

Eastern Asia

China, Hong Kong, Macau, Japan, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan

Southeastern Asia

Brunei, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia,
Laos, Malaysia,
Myanmar(Burma), Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam

Southern Asia

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka

Central Asia

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan

Western Asia

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, State of Palestine, Syria, Turkey, United Arab
Emirates, Yemen

Northern Europe

Åland Islands, Denmark, Estonia, Faroe Islands, Finland, Guernsey, Iceland,
Ireland, Isle of Man, Jersey, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sark, Svalbard and Jan
Mayen, Sweden, United Kingdom

Western Europe

Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco,
Netherlands, Switzerland

Eastern Europe

Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic (Czechia), Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania,
Russia, Slovakia, Ukraine
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Southern Europe

Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Gibraltar, Greece, Italy, Malta,
Montenegro, North Macedonia, Portugal, San Marino, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Holy
See

Northern Africa

Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, Western Sahara

Western Africa

Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte dIvoire (Ivory Coast), Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Saint Helena,
Ascension and Tristan da Cunha, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo

Middle Africa

Angola, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, São Tomé and Príncipe

Eastern Africa

Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mauritius, Mayotte, Mozambique, Réunion, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South
Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Southern Africa

Botswana, Eswatini (Swaziland), Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa

South America

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Falkland Islands, French
Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands,
Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela

Central America

Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama

Caribbean

Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Bonaire, Sint Eustatius
and Saba, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cuba, Curaçao, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Haiti, Jamaica, Martinique, Montserrat,
Puerto Rico, Saint Barthélemy, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Martin
(French part), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sint Maarten (Dutch part), Trinidad
and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, United States Virgin Islands

North America

Bermuda, Canada, Greenland, and Saint Pierre and Miquelon

USA

United States of America

New York City

New York City

Supplementary Table 2: Flight data containing the number of flight passengers from New York City.
Listed are the number of passengers flying from one of the New York City airports internationally. The
number of flights is shown by month and separated by region of destination.
Region

January

Oceania

18,177

25

February
12,539

March

April

May

June

7,291

282

380

446

July
1,586

Eastern Asia

124,386

78,801

54,191

9,808

11,586

11,781

21,799

South Eastern Asia

50,130

29,469

15,749

1,041

535

2,339

3,301

Southern Asia

73,043

57,603

35,340

2,092

1,296

2,129

7,234

Central Asia

3,157

2,435

1,358

20

8

43

179

Western Asia

73,979

61,964

44,121

4,795

3,986

9,558

15,220

Northern Europe

168,356

159,366

62,589

8,829

6,326

7,082

19,851

Western Europe

142,773

128,006

58,582

6,909

8,721

17,276

28,028

Eastern Europe

34,236

25,800

16,628

3,849

1,518

3,065

7,937

Southern Europe

117,185

94,962

43,464

2,865

908

7,494

16,247

Northern Africa

14,914

12,390

8,322

131

95

340

7,103

Western Africa

11,054

8,477

6,927

134

232

1,057

2,332

Middle Africa

723

530

286

1

1

12

6

Eastern Africa

13,403

11,680

5,946

311

177

683

1,468

Southern Africa

8,565

6,472

4,584

22

1

93

208

South America

113,540

102,576

61,460

2,700

1,690

4,185

11,881

Central America

142,359

125,227

70,698

6,279

1,718

9,178

20,139

North America*

109,705

100,636

74,599

2,913

1,231

2,832

10,233

Caribbean

372,642

333,469

136,756

14,025

11,839

17,455

179,675

*Flights from New York City to destinations within the United States are not included in this table.

Supplementary Table 3: Transmission events captured in each subsample shown by region. Listed
below are the number of transmission events captured in each subsample. Each row contains a different
geographic region along with the number of transmission events in each subsample and their average.
Region

First Subsample

Oceania

4

26

Second
Subsample
0

Third Subsample Average
2

2

Eastern Asia

1

2

1

1.33

South Eastern Asia

0

0

0

0

Southern Asia

0

1

0

0.33

Central Asia

1

1

1

1

Western Asia

9

4

11

8

Northern Europe

11

13

19

14.33

Western Europe

24

18

20

20.67

Eastern Europe

3

1

4

2.67

Southern Europe

3

1

3

2.33

Northern Africa

5

3

4

4

Western Africa

0

1

0

0.33

Middle Africa

0

0

0

0

Eastern Africa

0

0

0

0

Southern Africa

0

0

0

0

South America

17

10

16

14.33

Central America

8

6

9

7.67

8

14

15

12.33

0

0

0

0

North America*
Caribbean

*Transmission events from New York City that spread within the United States are not included in this table.
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Supplementary Figure 1. Flight passengers from New York City against the number of incident
cases within New York City. Each line corresponds with a geographic region that was travelled to
from New York City between January 2020 and the end of July 2020. The bar graph in the
background is the number of incident cases within the city by epiweek in the same time period. It
wasn’t until March that New York city was officially reporting cases of COVID-19. Cases peaked in
the end of March and the beginning of April during this study period.
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